

Voluntary Purchases and Selection in the Market for Flood Insurance

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
February 10, 2021

Flood Insurance in the US




- Flood-related events most costly disasters in the U.S.
- 2017: just under \$300B in damages (NOAA NCEI)
- By 2100: \approx \$1.3T of residential property at risk (Zillow)

Flood Insurance in the US: National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)



- NFIP primary provider of flood insurance → 96% of residential policies (Kousky et al., 2018)
- In addition to underwriting, NFIP responsible for publishing rate maps (FIRMs)
- Maps used to set NFIP rates, delineate Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs)

Flood Insurance in the US: Voluntary Purchases



Motivation

- Policies outside SFHAs account for a large (and growing) share of overall NFIP policies and claims
- Prior work examining NFIP take-up has focused on areas within SFHAs or aggregate geographies
 - Eg, Kriesel and Landry, 2004; Kousky, 2011; Atreya et al., 2015; Mulder, 2019; Wagner, 2020
- Pending and proposed NFIP reforms (e.g., “Risk Rating 2.0”) are likely to have a major impact on non-SFHA policies

Summary of Findings

- We use historical NFIP policy and claims data to examine aggregate demand for **SFHA** and **non-SFHA** policies at the tract-level
 - Find heterogeneity in take-up on household characteristics
 - Find **non-SFHA** take-up response to salient flooding events
 - Use policy variation to estimate price elasticities: **non-SFHA** demand elastic relative to **SFHA**
 - Find suggestive evidence that homeowners select into insurance based on un-priced risk

Outline

Approach to Analyzing Demand


Voluntary Purchases and Sociodemographics

Salience and Voluntary Take-up

Estimating Demand Elasticities

Evidence of Selection

Empirical Setting: National Flood Insurance Program



Year = 2019; Grey = No PIF 2009-2019.

Transaction-level policy and claims data from OpenFEMA

- Covers 2009-2020
- Includes coverage amount, premium, etc.
- Cannot *explicitly* link policies over time or claims to policies (see Mulder, 2019)
- Limited geographic data

Analyzing Demand

- NFIP take-up rate captures extensive margin demand for aggregate geography
- Let $d_{it} = 1$ if household $i \in \{1, \dots, N_j\} = \mathcal{I}_j$ purchases insurance in period t , where N_j is the number of households in geography j . Then take-up rate for geography j , y_{jt} is

$$y_{jt} = \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{I}_j}[d_{it}] = Pr_{\mathcal{I}_j}(d_{it} = 1) = N_j^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^{N_j} d_{it}$$

- Need to know the size of the relevant market, N_j
- Focus on smallest aggregate geography included in NFIP data: census tracts

Constructing Measures of non-SFHA/SFHA Take-up

- Use NYU Furman Center's method to get tract-by-non-SFHA/SFHA housing unit counts:
 - Intersect nationwide FIRMs with 2010 Census blocks
 - Assign non-SFHA/SFHA using block centroids
 - Aggregate non-SFHA/SFHA housing unit counts (2010 Census) to tract-level
- Then use annual tract-by-non-SFHA/SFHA counts of policies-in-force (PIF)
- Pro: allows us to separately examine aggregate demand for non-SFHA and SFHA areas
- Con(s): static, potential for measurement error \implies use PIF to check robustness

Analyzing (Extensive Margin) Demand

- Run a series of regressions of the general form

$$y_{jt} = \mathbf{X}_{jt}'\boldsymbol{\beta} + c_j + c_t + \varepsilon_{jt}$$

where

- y_{jt} is non-SFHA/SFHA take-up for tract j in year t
- \mathbf{X}_{jt} includes time-variant and time-invariant tract- and tract-zone-level attributes
- c_j and c_t are unobserved effects on non-SFHA/SFHA take-up at the tract- and year-levels
- Will use both county/tract FEs to account for c_j
- Std. errors clustered at the tract-level throughout
- Robustness of all primary results to functional form: fractional response probit

Analyzing (Extensive Margin) Demand

What's in X_{jt} ?

- Time-varying:
 - By non-SFHA/SFHA: average policy premium, average CRS discount (FEMA)
 - Homeowner demographics/household characteristics (5-year ACS estimates)
 - Presidential disaster declarations (FEMA)
 - Individual Assistance funding (FEMA)
 - High precipitation days (NOAA)
- Time-invariant:
 - By non-SFHA/SFHA: FSF Flood Factor
 - Geographic attributes: water area, average soil permeability, coastal indicator (Decennial Census, USDA)
- Full panel covers 2009-2019

▶ Summary statistics

Outline

Approach to Analyzing Demand


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Insurance Demand and Homeowner/Household Attributes




- Mean **non-SFHA** tract-level take-up: 0.041
- Mean **SFHA** tract-level take-up: 0.299
- Year- and county-FE's
- Conditional on observed controls

▶ PIF results

▶ Full results

Insurance Demand and Homeowner/Household Attributes




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


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Insurance Demand and Homeowner/Household Attributes



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Approach to Analyzing Demand


Voluntary Purchases and Sociodemographics

Salience and Voluntary Take-up

Estimating Demand Elasticities

Evidence of Selection

Insurance Demand and Salient Flooding Events



- Relevant disaster declarations: flooding, severe storms, coastal storms, hurricanes
- Event study around all relevant declarations
- Estimated using year- and tract-FE's and controls

► Lagged PDD

► Storm Events

Outline

Approach to Analyzing Demand

Voluntary Purchases and Sociodemographics

Salience and Voluntary Take-up


Estimating Demand Elasticities

Evidence of Selection

Estimating Price Elasticities


- Despite controlling for a rich set of observables, potential for price endogeneity
 - Need to isolate price variation that is uncorrelated with demand determinants (risk, etc.)
- Use two policy-induced sources of variation:
 - non-SFHA: Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act (HFIAA) of 2014
 - SFHA: Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012

Non-SFHA Price Variation: HFIAA 2014



- Generally very little variation in non-SFHA rates
- HFIAA 2014: introduced differential surcharge for primary/non-primary homes
- $z^{nSFHA} = \mathbb{1}[t \geq 2015] \times (\%nonPrimary_{j,t=2014}^{nSFHA})$
- Identifying assumption:
 $\mathbb{E}[z^{nSFHA} \times \varepsilon_{jt} | \mathbf{X}_{jt}, c_j, c_t] = 0$

SFHA Price Variation: Biggert-Waters 2012



- Policy variation used in Wagner (2020) for SFHA demand
- B-W 2012/HFIAA 2014: introduced differential price change for pre-/post-FIRM construction homes
- $z^{SFHA} = \mathbb{1}[t \geq 2013] \times (\%postFIRM_{j,t=2012}^{SFHA})$
- Identifying assumption: $\mathbb{E}[z^{SFHA} \times \varepsilon_{jt} | \mathbf{X}_{jt}, c_j, c_t] = 0$

Price Elasticity Estimates

| | nSFHA Take-up | | SFHA Take-up | |
|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| | OLS | 2SLS | OLS | 2SLS |
| Avg. Policy Cost nSFHA | -0.017*** (0.002) | -0.023** (0.011) | | |
| Avg. Policy Cost SFHA | | | 0.008*** (0.001) | -0.055*** (0.009) |
| Elasticity Estimate | -0.213 | -0.282 | 0.032 | -0.209 |
| K-P F Stat | | 245.368 | | 796.082 |
| Observations | 286,666 | 272,331 | 234,265 | 225,756 |

- All results estimated with non-price (time-varying) controls, tract- and year-FE
- OLS estimates biased upward
- Greater price-sensitivity outside SFHA

▶ Probit results

▶ Event study figs

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
Selection in the Market for Flood Insurance

- Potential for (adverse) selection major factor in proposed and potential NFIP reforms
- Specific concern: given coarse rate schedule, large subsidies, potential for selection on unpriced risk

Testing for Asymmetric Information


- Question: Is the NFIP characterized by asymmetric (or asymmetrically used) information about risk?
- Finkelstein and Poterba (2014): “unused observables” test
 - An attribute represents asymmetric (or asymmetrically used) information if it is correlated both with subsequent claims experience and insurance demand conditional on prices
 - Does not require exogenous changes in unused observable
 - Unused observable: FSF Flood Factors
- Construct cost measures using NFIP claims data:
 - Claim probability for non-SFHA and SFHA
 - Average claim per \$1 of coverage by tract-year for non-SFHA and SFHA

Testing for Asymmetric Information: Demand



- FSF Flood Factor $\in \{1, \dots, 10\}$
- Mean **non-SFHA** tract-level take-up: 0.041
- Mean **SFHA** tract-level take-up: 0.299
- Conditional on price, non-price controls, year- and county-FE's

Testing for Asymmetric Information: Cost



► Avg. claim amount

- FSF Flood Factor $\in \{1, \dots, 10\}$
- $Pr(\text{claim})_{jt} = \frac{\text{Total claims}_{jt}}{\text{Total PIF}_{jt}}$
- Mean **non-SFHA** claim probability: 0.012
- Mean **SFHA** claim probability: 0.018
- Conditional on price, non-price controls, year- and county-FE's

Testing for Asymmetric Information

- Suggestive evidence of the form of private information in flood insurance markets
- Correlation between demand and FSF Flood Factor suggests presence asymmetric risk information in both segments of market
- Correlation between cost and FSF Flood factor supports conclusion that this is active adverse selection due to unpriced risk

▶ Selection on (un)observables

Summary

- We use historical NFIP policy and claims data to examine aggregate demand for SFHA and non-SFHA policies at the tract-level
 - Use policy variation to estimate price elasticities: non-SFHA demand elastic relative to SFHA
 - Find suggestive evidence that homeowners select into insurance based on un-priced risk
- Important implications for
 - “Risk Rating 2.0” and other potential reforms: unraveling, NFIP fiscal solvency
 - Private entry in flood insurance market

Backup slides

Summary of Tract-level Panel

| | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|--------------------------|---------|----------|------|-----------|
| SFHA Take Up | 0.30 | 0.32 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| nSFHA Take Up | 0.04 | 0.11 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| SFHA PIF | 99.97 | 357.69 | 0.00 | 13,713.00 |
| nSFHA PIF | 67.36 | 191.61 | 0.00 | 7,106.00 |
| Total NFIP Claims: SFHA | 1.88 | 30.36 | 0.00 | 3,804.00 |
| Total NFIP Claims: nSFHA | 0.80 | 11.25 | 0.00 | 1392.00 |
| Avg. CRS Discount SFHA | 0.05 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.45 |
| Avg. CRS Discount nSFHA | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.10 |
| Avg. Policy Cost SFHA | 1053.40 | 816.28 | 0.00 | 35,756.96 |
| Avg. Policy Cost nSFHA | 515.20 | 191.72 | 0.00 | 5,603.29 |
| Observations | | 355,674 | | |

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Summary of Tract-level Panel

| | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|----------------------------------|------------|------------|----------|--------------|
| <i>Homeowner Attributes</i> | | | | |
| Pct. of Pop. with College Degree | 0.31 | 0.19 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Millennial Pct. of Pop. | 0.19 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.90 |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.70 |
| Minority Pct. of Pop. | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Total Population | 4,835.10 | 2,285.07 | 0.00 | 72,041.00 |
| <i>Household Attributes</i> | | | | |
| Median HH Income | 69,744.12 | 34,527.77 | 2,499.00 | 297,918.32 |
| Median Home Value | 269,331.20 | 223,657.43 | 9,999.00 | 2,157,289.39 |
| Median Year of Home Const. | 1975.49 | 15.47 | 1939.00 | 2014.00 |
| Pct. of HH with a Mortgage | 0.64 | 0.14 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Observations | | 355,674 | | |


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Summary of Tract-level Panel

| | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|-----------------------------------|----------|-----------|---------|------------|
| <i>Geography Attributes</i> | | | | |
| Number of High Precipitation Days | 59.11 | 20.30 | 1.00 | 134.00 |
| DD: All Rel. Cumul. 5-year Lag | 2.18 | 1.99 | 0.00 | 12.00 |
| Total IA Count Cumul. 5-year Lag | 53462.73 | 159795.36 | 0.00 | 1000652.00 |
| Coastal Tract | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Total Tract Area: Water | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 1.23 |
| Total Tract Area: Land | 0.11 | 0.52 | 0.00 | 24.59 |
| Soil Permeability | 24.93 | 24.77 | 0.25 | 126.89 |
| Avg. FF SFHA | 6.07 | 2.41 | 0.00 | 10.00 |
| Avg. FF nSFHA | 5.43 | 1.45 | 0.00 | 10.00 |
| FSF-FEMA Exposed Pct. Diff. | 3.19 | 16.02 | -100.00 | 100.00 |
| Observations | | 355,674 | | |

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
Insurance Demand and Homeowner/Household Attributes



- Mean **non-SFHA** tract-level PIF: 67.3642
- Mean **SFHA** tract-level PIF: 99.972
- Year- and county-FE's
- Conditional on observed controls

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
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
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Full results

| | nSFHA Take-up | | SFHA Take-up | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| <i>Homeowner Attributes</i> | | | | |
| Pct. of Pop. with College Degree | 0.046*** (0.006) | 0.015*** (0.004) | 0.040** (0.020) | 0.024** (0.011) |
| Pct. of Pop. under 35 | -0.097*** (0.008) | -0.021*** (0.004) | -0.104*** (0.024) | -0.046*** (0.012) |
| Unemployment Rate | 0.026** (0.012) | 0.013*** (0.004) | 0.036 (0.035) | 0.037*** (0.013) |
| Minority Pct. of Pop. | -0.016*** (0.004) | 0.004 (0.003) | -0.065*** (0.014) | -0.009 (0.009) |
| Log(Total Population) | -0.003* (0.002) | 0.020*** (0.003) | 0.026*** (0.005) | 0.050*** (0.006) |
| <i>Household Attributes</i> | | | | |
| Log(Median HH Income) | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.000 (0.001) | -0.026*** (0.009) | -0.000 (0.004) |
| Log(Median Home Value) | 0.027*** (0.003) | -0.001 (0.001) | 0.059*** (0.007) | 0.022*** (0.003) |
| Median Home Construction Age | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.000*** (0.000) | 0.003*** (0.000) | -0.001*** (0.000) |
| Pct. of HH with a Mortgage | 0.009 (0.006) | -0.001 (0.002) | 0.150*** (0.017) | 0.026*** (0.007) |
| County FE | ✓ | | ✓ | |
| Tract FE | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Observations | 287,201 | 286,666 | 233,778 | 234,265 |

Full results



| | nSFHA Take-up | | SFHA Take-up | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| <i>Geography Attributes</i> | | | | |
| Number of High Precipitation Days | 0.004*** (0.001) | 0.003*** (0.000) | 0.009** (0.004) | 0.007*** (0.002) |
| DD: All Rel. Cumul. 5-year Lag | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.000* (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) |
| Total IA Count Cumul. 5-year Lag | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | -0.003*** (0.000) | -0.003*** (0.000) |
| Coastal Tract | 0.033*** (0.004) | | 0.034*** (0.005) | |
| Total Tract Area: Water | 0.130* (0.068) | | -0.569*** (0.152) | |
| Total Tract Area: Land | -0.006*** (0.001) | | -0.022*** (0.004) | |
| Soil Permeability | 0.005*** (0.001) | | 0.005*** (0.002) | |
| FSF-FEMA Exposed Pct. Diff. | -0.001*** (0.000) | | -0.000 (0.000) | |
| Avg. FF nSFHA | 0.002** (0.001) | | | |
| Avg. FF SFHA | | | 0.008*** (0.001) | |
| County FE | ✓ | | ✓ | |
| Tract FE | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Observations | 287,201 | 286,666 | 233,778 | 234,265 |

Full results

| | nSFHA Take-up | | SFHA Take-up | |
|-------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| <i>NFIP Policy Attributes</i> | | | | |
| Avg. CRS Discount nSFHA | 0.390*** (0.047) | -0.074*** (0.009) | | |
| Avg. Policy Cost nSFHA | 0.048*** (0.004) | -0.017*** (0.002) | | |
| Avg. CRS Discount SFHA | | | 0.573*** (0.035) | 0.208*** (0.020) |
| Avg. Policy Cost SFHA | | | 0.031*** (0.003) | 0.008*** (0.001) |
| County FE | ✓ | | ✓ | |
| Tract FE | | ✓ | | ✓ |
| Year FE | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Observations | 287,201 | 286,666 | 233,778 | 234,265 |

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
Insurance Demand and Salient Flooding Events



- Take-up elasticities wrt. lagged PDD counts
- RHS conditional on lagged IA funding amounts

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Insurance Demand and Salient Flooding Events



- Relevant disaster declarations: flash flooding, flooding, hurricane, storm surge/tide, tropical storm
- Event study around all relevant events
- Estimated using year- and tract-FE's and controls

Price Elasticity Estimates

| | nSFHA Take-up | | SFHA Take-up | |
|------------------------|--|----------------------|---|----------------------|
| | 2SLS | Probit | 2SLS | Probit |
| Avg. Policy Cost nSFHA | -0.023** (0.011) | -0.056*** (0.017) | | |
| Avg. Policy Cost SFHA | | | -0.055*** (0.009) | -0.123*** (0.013) |
| Instrument | $\mathbb{1}[t \geq 2015] \times (\%nonPrimary_{j,t=2014}^{nSFHA})$ | | $\mathbb{1}[t \geq 2013] \times (\%postFIRM_{j,t=2012}^{SFHA})$ | |
| Elasticity Estimate | -0.282 | -0.815 | -0.209 | -0.507 |
| K-P F Stat | 245.368 | | 796.082 | |
| Observations | 272331 | 272596 | 225756 | 225963 |

- 2SLS estimated with non-price (time-varying) controls, tract- and year-FE
- Probit results estimated using Papke and Wooldridge (2008) approach


Non-SFHA Price Variation: HFIAA 2014



- HFIAA 2014: introduced differential surcharge for primary/non-primary homes
- **Non-SFHA** take-up regressed on $\sum_{t=2009}^{2019} \mathbb{1}[t = year] \times (\%nonPrimary_{j,t=2014}^{nSFHA})$
- Includes time-varying controls, tract- and year-FE


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SFHA Price Variation: Biggert-Waters 2012



- Policy variation used in Wagner (2020) for SFHA demand
- B-W 2012/HFIAA 2014: introduced differential price change for pre-/post-FIRM construction homes
- SFHA take-up regressed on $\sum_{t=2009}^{2019} \mathbb{1}[t = \text{year}] \times (\%postFIRM_{j,t=2012}^{SFHA})$
- Includes time-varying controls, tract- and year-FE

Testing for Asymmetric Information: Cost



- FSF Flood Factor $\in \{1, \dots, 10\}$
- Mean **non-SFHA** claim payment/\$1000 of coverage: \$12.130
- Mean **SFHA** claim payment/\$1000 of coverage: \$14.108
- Conditional on price, non-price controls, year- and county-FE's

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Selection on (Un)observables

| | nSFHA Claim Prob. | | SFHA Claim Prob. | |
|------------------------|-------------------|---------|------------------|-----------|
| Avg. Policy Cost nSFHA | 0.017* | -0.002 | | |
| | (0.010) | (0.020) | | |
| Avg. FF nSFHA | 0.001*** | | | |
| | (0.000) | | | |
| Avg. Policy Cost SFHA | | | -0.008*** | -0.056*** |
| | | | (0.002) | (0.004) |
| Avg. FF SFHA | | | 0.002*** | |
| | | | (0.000) | |
| Tract FE | | ✓ | ✓ | |
| County FE | ✓ | | ✓ | |
| Year-FE/Controls | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| K-P F Stat | 493.240 | 363.989 | 2092.459 | 1822.775 |
| Observations | 318,786 | 321,002 | 282,922 | 284,923 |

$$- z^{nSFHA} = \mathbb{1}[t \geq 2015] \times (\%nonPrimary_{j,t=2014}^{nSFHA})$$

$$- z^{SFHA} = \mathbb{1}[t \geq 2013] \times (\%postFIRM_{j,t=2012}^{SFHA})$$